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Abstract: This study investigates the survival and growth trends in a cohort of new 
technology-based firms (NTBFs) established in Sweden in 2006. This cohort has faced both 
an economic upswing and a severe downturn, which started in 2008, and by 2014 provides 
eight years of historical records. Our study makes several contributions to the current 
understanding of NTBF survival and growth. First, our empirical observations show that 
many NTBFs (72%) from the 2006 cohort were still operating at the end of 2014, indicating a 
much higher survival rate than those found in previous studies. Second, surviving firms from 
the 2006 cohort positively affected employment, as their annual job creation was higher than 
the reduction in employment caused by exiting firms. Third, very few companies experienced 
high-growth during their first seven years, and employment growth and sales growth were 
highly correlated among high-growth firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
To what extent do new technology-based firms (NTBFs) benefit society? The post-founding 
performance of NTBFs has received an increasing amount of attention during the past decade, 
mainly because growing NTBFs are believed to lead to desired benefits. For example, 
Henrekson and Johansson’s (2010) literature review found only 20 studies on high-growth 
firms published after 1990, whereas four years later, Coad et al. (2014) identified more than 
100 papers in their Google Scholar search on the topic. These studies, however, tend to focus 
solely on growing firms. Discussing the benefits of a few high-growth firms, scholars seem to 
have disregarded the job destruction nature of exiting new and young firms (Shane, 2009). In 
any given year, many NTBFs exit and, thus, destroy recently created jobs. While few studies 
provide valuable information about the early survival rates of new firms (Geroski et al., 2010; 
Macdonald, 2012; Anyadike-Danes et al., 2015; Löfsten, 2016), most studies do not clearly 
define the specific patterns of NTBF exits. However, to appreciate the benefits of NTBFs, it is 
important to investigate both survival and exit patterns of such companies in the same frame 
of study.  
 
More importantly, due to methodological choices, knowledge of the contribution of NTBFs is 
still limited. First, when we focus on the impact of growing new firms, we tend to consider 
growth only in new companies that develop over the observation period. As a consequence, 
we neglect the development of non-growing and exiting companies. Second, few studies have 
analyzed growth and survival patterns of very small new firms, and many growth studies in 
entrepreneurship investigated larger new companies. For example, the seminal study of 
Delmar et al. (2003) analyzed growth among firms with more than 20 employees. In a similar 
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fashion, some official definitions of high-growth firms only include firms with a certain 
threshold size (e.g., the OECD focuses on firms with more than 10 employees).  
 
However, Andersson and Klepper (2013) have exploited a dataset to identify all new firms in 
the private sector in Sweden each year for the period 1993–2005, as well as new 
establishments created by existing firms, and a novel finding is that the larger the size of their 
parent, the greater the rate of employment growth in spin-offs. Ejermo and Xiao (2013) used a 
population of entrepreneurial firms entering the Swedish economy from 1991 to 2002, which 
they followed until 2007. They found that (i) NTBFs generally experience a lower hazard rate 
compared to other entrepreneurial firms, (ii) all entrepreneurial firms follow a pro-cyclical 
pattern of survival likelihood over the business cycle, and (iii) when comparing NTBFs with 
firms without self-employees, they found that NTBFs are more sensitive to business cycle 
fluctuations. While these approaches have advanced our knowledge of the development and 
growth of young firms in general, many studies focusing on “larger” small firms indicate that 
we still know relatively little about the early development of new firms, especially those with 
less than 10 employees, and that many entrepreneurial activities have been excluded from the 
literature. Other studies focus on firm characteristics related to firm growth (Davidsson et al., 
2002, Chan et al. 2006, Brenner and Schimke, 2015), venture creation speed and the 
subsequent venture growth (Capelleras et. al, 2010 ) and life cycle characteristics of small 
firms (Masurel and Van Montfort, 2006). 
 
Our study aims at improving our assessment of the impact of NTBFs. We investigate the 
survival and growth patterns in a cohort of NTBFs in Sweden. Since cohort analysis 
concentrates on the set of new firms that began operations in the same year, it is possible to 
investigate not only how and why some new companies can stabilize their operations and 
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grow, but also why some others struggle and do not find their way through the critical post-
founding phase. Our study provides several contributions to the literature, especially the 
technology entrepreneurship literature (see Ratinho et al., (2015) for a description of this 
research field). First, the cohort approach allows us to investigate all new firms, regardless of 
their size. Second, while only a few studies (e.g., Coad et al., 2014) consider both the left- and 
right-hand tail of the growth rate distribution, we go beyond decline, mortality, and growth by 
analyzing why and when some new firms exit, while others remain. Third, NTBFs are 
believed to have the highest wealth creation potential among new companies. Interestingly, 
some empirical evidence indicates that NTBFs do not necessarily have higher probabilities of 
faster growth than other companies (Almus, 2002); technology and firm size seem to increase 
only survival chances (Giovannetti et al., 2011). We try to shed light on these earlier 
empirical observations by looking at both the survival and growth patterns of a cohort of 
NTBFs, contributing to the policy discussion about the role of NTBFs in the creation of social 
benefits. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review and the research questions and Section 3 describes the study’s empirical setting. 
Section 4 presents the empirical evidence, while Section 5 discusses the empirical findings 
and concludes the study. 
  
 
2.  Literature review and research questions 	
2.1 Introduction 
Firm creation is widely embraced because new firms seem to contribute to overall economic 
health (Gallagher et al., 1986). While new firms have high mortality rates (Dunne et al., 1988; 
Audretsch, 1995), only a small minority of surviving firms want to grow, and finally achieve 
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enough growth to have a positive social impact (Storey, 1994; Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 
2000; Napier et al., 2012). Consequently, policymakers and entrepreneurship researchers 
focus on these remaining firms, especially the high-growth firms. To analyze this mounting 
interest in firm growth, we looked at some recent studies from the Scopus research database 
using the search term “growth AND firm” in all social sciences articles from 2011. Since this 
resulted in over 4000 results, we further restricted the search to the ten most popular 
entrepreneurship or innovation journals. In descending order, these were: Small Business 
Economics (75 hits), Research Policy (38 hits), Industrial and Corporate Change (37 hits), 
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development (32 hits), International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Small Business (29 hits), International Small Business Journal (29 hits), 
Journal of Business Venturing (16 hits), International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior and 
Research (15 hits), Journal of Small Business Management (14 hits), and Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Development (13 hits). The publication years show the rising interest; there 
were 11 articles published in 2012, 11 in 2013, 13 in 2014, and 14 in 2015. These figures 
suggest that the interest in growth studies has increased over the past few years.  
 
Our analysis of sampling strategies among the 45 studies selected (which were required to be 
empirical analyses on firm growth) suggests three different approaches in recent growth 
studies. First, some scholars use a dataset containing an entire population of (active) firms for 
a given timeframe across industries or in chosen industries. About 20% of the identified 
studies used this approach. For example, Peric et al. (2016) studied firm survival and growth 
among all Croatian firms in manufacturing and hospitality during 2008-2014. Second, instead 
of studying the entire population of new firms, a large majority of past growth studies (around 
70%) use a sampling strategy resulting in either representative or non-representative samples. 
These studies are based on varying numbers of observations. For example, Lechner et al.’s 
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(2016) study contained only 65 observations, while that of Lee (2014) was based on 4,858 
firms. Third, some rare studies (around 10%) focus on one cohort or multiple cohorts of firms 
and follow their development over a number of years. For example, Anyadike-Danes et al. 
(2015) studied a cohort of startups created in 1998 in multiple countries. Box (2008) 
investigated the life spans of nearly 2,200 firms in seven birth cohorts of Swedish joint-stock 
companies, founded in seven separate years between 1899 and 1950. Employing a cohort 
approach, the studies relate firm survival to firm age and size, as well as to the effect of cohort 
affiliation and environmental change over time. Cohort affiliation and environmental forces, 
in other words, period effects, may explain differences in death rates among different firm 
populations. 
 
However, while cohort studies automatically also consider small firms, in population-level 
and sample-based studies, new or small firms are excluded from the analyses. From the 45 
studies reviewed, 13 studies impose a clear age limit, and 13 studies impose a clear size limit. 
For example, Duschl and Peng (2015) exclude firms with less than five employees because 
“the growth process of micro-firms tends to be rather noisy.” There was clearly no age limit 
in 15 of the identified studies, and no size restriction in 10 studies. Capasso et al.’s (2015) 
study had both these properties. In addition, the role of age (in 17 studies) and size (in 23 
studies) in the sampling was unclear, or the results did not contain descriptive statistics. For 
example, a study by García-Manjón et al. (2012) investigating the relationship between 
research and development (R&D) and growth reports the nominal sales statistics for the 
sample companies but does not discuss firm age or the number of employees, which makes it 
difficult to position the results among similar studies. Among recent growth studies, the most 
popular measure of growth seems to be the log difference of sales, though some cases use 
additional measures, such as employment change.  
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These shortcomings should be a motivation to anyone who wishes to investigate new firm 
developments from their establishment onwards. That is, it would be important for knowledge 
creation to approach the firm´s survival and growth through detailed analyses of a 
representative sample, and investigate what happens to each firm (exit/survival/growth) 
during their early years. Criscuolo et al. (2014) use micro-aggregated data in their analysis of 
employment growth in 18 countries for the sake of harmonization. Geroski (1995) states that 
entry seems to be relatively common in most industries, but that small-scale, de novo entrants 
generally have a rather short life expectancy, and concludes entry appears to be relatively 
easy, but survival is not. Caves (1998) analyzes how structural entry barriers affect the 
behavior of actual entrants, and find that gross entry is substantial in most industries because 
it is much larger than net entry, due to high rates of infant firm mortality. 
 
While these studies provide valuable information about the post entry performance of new 
firms, we believe it is important to address the gaps caused by micro-aggregation to continue 
advancing our knowledge about new firm survival and growth patterns. Thus, to advance our 
understanding of new firms’ early development, we conduct a detailed firm-level analysis on 
both the survival and growth of a cohort of NTBFs. To guide our analysis, we formally pose 
three specific research questions. 
 
2.2  Survival and exit patterns among NTBFs 
Academic research has shown that survival rates range from 30% to 55% among new firms, 
depending on the time frame and industry in question. In the 1980s, Portuguese companies 
showed survival rates between 32% and 36% after eight years of existence (Geroski et al., 
2010), similar to Canadian firms founded in 2002 (Macdonald, 2012). Macdonald (2012) 
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observed a survival rate of 38% among companies in the “Professional, scientific, and 
technical services” sector. Disney et al. (2003) observed survival rates between 33% and 52% 
among seven-year-old firms in the UK, the US, Canada, Portugal, France, and Italy. The five-
year survival rate of European firms founded in 2005 and still operating in 2010 is around 
46.4% (Eurostat, 2013). As a general rule, Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007) state that more than 
50% of new firms exit the market within the first five years of activity. So far, the highest 
survival rates have been presented by Löfsten (2016), who observed that the survival rate 
among NTBFs was 55% (between 2005-2014). A high survival rate of NTBFs may relate to 
being part of technology or innovation systems, which increase survival chances, but may 
also limit growth opportunities within the system (Autio, 1997). Therefore, we would expect a 
survival rate higher than 50% among NTBFs within eight years of their founding.  
 
The survival rates observed by earlier studies suggest that these rates are relatively similar in 
different sectors. For example, Macdonald (2012) found surprisingly little variation across 
industries for Canadian firms founded in 2002. However, we would expect significant 
differences in firms’ survival and growth rates across industries. For example, in the IT sector 
the app–industry is currently relatively easy to enter, but, at the same time, it provides high 
yields only when the firms succeed. In other words, many enter the market, but many fail, and 
very few achieve significant growth. Therefore, we would expect significant sector 
differences in survival rates among NTBFs. In addition, based on the notion of liability-of-
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Djupdal and Westhead, 2015), new firms are vulnerable in the 
very first years after their founding. The consequence of this notion is that we should observe 
relatively more exits during the first few years, and fewer afterwards.  
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Furthermore, intuitively, we tend to think about a firm exit as an involuntary act, which 
represents approximately 49% of all exits in Sweden (Wennberg et al., 2010). Coleman et al. 
(2013) distinguished two types of exit: closures (permanently stopped operations), and 
mergers or acquisitions, and found serial entrepreneurs in the service sector were more likely 
to exit through merger or acquisition. Coleman et al. concluded that firms with more 
experienced and more highly educated owners were likely to survive, and that R&D activities 
did not significantly improve the chances of survival because firms are riskier and thus 
subject to a higher failure rate.  
 
Finally, because of the liability-of-smallness characteristic (Freeman et al., 1983) of new 
firms, we would expect a higher volatility among smaller NTBFs. Due to their small size, 
some NTBFs are more vulnerable to external shocks than larger NTBFs. As a consequence, 
we could expect the NTBFs that developed during the observation period to face exit less 
often than those NTBFs that remained small. To explore these issues, we introduce the 
following research question:  
 
RQ1: What are the survival and mortality patterns of NTBFs during their early years?  
  
2.3  Growth patterns among NTBFs 
Achieving high growth is relatively rare. It is widely accepted that growth rate distributions of 
small firms are tent-shaped (Coad and Hölzl, 2009), meaning that only a few companies 
experience extreme growth events (either positive or negative). According to the OECD, 
when the employment based criterion is used, the share of high-growth firms varies between 
2% and 6% (OECD, 2015). When sales development is used, the proportion of high-growth 
companies ranges from 5% to 15% (OECD, 2015). Moreover, according to past research, 
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firms in high-technology sectors do not experience strong growth with higher probability than 
companies in other industries (Coad et al., 2014). Therefore, we would not expect to observe 
more high growth firms among Swedish NTBFs than what is observed among startups in 
general.  
 
Recent research has shown that companies have idiosyncratic growth patterns that are not 
easy to identify by looking at averages across firms (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006). It has been 
suggested that these growth patterns depend on two dimensions: a firm’s size and its lagged 
growth rate (Coad, 2007; Hamilton, 2011). Small companies are found to experience negative 
autocorrelation, especially in the case of fast-growing firms, reflecting their erratic growth 
patterns (Coad, 2007). Large companies are likely to experience positive autocorrelation, 
irrespective of their growth rate in the previous period (Coad, 2007). Besides manufacturing, 
these results seem to also hold in the service sector. Concerning service industries, Coad 
(2009) found that for micro firms (1-9 employees), sustained growth is a very rare 
phenomenon (negative autocorrelation), while for small and medium-sized firms, growth 
episodes stretch over a longer time horizon (positive autocorrelation). In support of this view, 
a recent study on medium-sized firms in the UK found that gazelles have difficulty sustaining 
the pace of growth for periods of longer duration (Parker et al., 2010). Therefore, high-growth 
firms seem to be a “temporally unstable population” (Delmar et al., 2003: 195). We should 
expect only a few companies to grow consistently over multiple years.  
 
Small firms that grew very fast in the previous period are particularly unlikely to repeat this 
growth performance (Coad, 2007; Coad and Hölzl, 2009). Many growth studies deal with 
firms that are larger in size, and thereby leave out a great deal of entrepreneurial activity. For 
example, the “Arriving at high growth firm” article by Delmar et al. (2003) studied growth 
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among firms larger than 20 employees. An observation from firm growth research is that 
there is still confusion about how to measure firm growth. Various researchers have argued 
that differences in the measurement of firm growth contribute to mixed results (Davidsson 
and Wiklund, 2000; Shepherd and Wiklund, 2009; Weinzimmer et al., 1998). To correct this 
situation, it has been suggested that researchers should use several different growth measures, 
rather than a single measure. The use of multiple growth measures would allow easier 
comparisons across studies, more substantial robustness checks, and qualitative investigation 
of the differences found between different quantitative indicators (Coad et al., 2014).  
 
However, sales and employee growth do not always move together. According to Delmar 
(2006), sales and employment figures represent different phases of growth processes. 
Whereas sales is an intermediary variable that responds to changes in supply and demand 
conditions, employment is an instrumental variable planned by the entrepreneur (Delmar, 
2006). Changes in sales are most likely highly correlated with changes in employment, but 
not necessarily; by hiring new employees, an entrepreneur can adjust a firm to a new level of 
demand through subcontracting or improving productivity (Delmar, 2006). However, instead 
of an internal growth strategy, a company can opt for an external growth strategy in which the 
firm obtains access to the resources needed to fulfill its commitments through cooperative 
means (Johannisson, 1990). To explore these issues in the case of NTBFs, we introduce the 
following research question:  
 
RQ2: What are the high growth patterns among NTBFs during their early years?  
 
2.4  Job creation and destruction patterns among NTBFs 
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Studies that highlight the unprecedented success of high-growth startups in creating new jobs 
generally disregard the possibility that exiting new firms could destroy more jobs than the 
surviving companies create (Shane, 2009). Knaup’s (2005) study using US data and Kirchhoff 
(1994), Persson (2004), and Wagner’s (1994) studies using European data show that each 
cohort of new firms employs more people in its first year than in every other year after that. 
Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989), using a data source developed by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration, found that on the average, 39.8 percent of new firms survive six or more 
years, and this is equivalent to a failure rate of three out of five, substantially lower than 
popularly believed. Headd and Kirchoff (2009) found that survival rates were not affected by 
macro-economic conditions. According to Shane (2009), policy makers believe a dangerous 
myth because they think that start-up companies are a magic bullet that will transform 
depressed economic regions, generate innovation, and create jobs. Shane underlines that to 
achieve more economic growth through more start-ups, new firms would need to be more 
productive than existing companies; however, they are not. Haltiwanger et al. (1999) 
combined data from the U.S. Census and other sources to look at the relationship between 
firm productivity and firm age, and the results showed that firm productivity increases with 
firm age. The typical start-up makes up for its poor productivity when it gets older because 
the typical U.S. start-up is dead in five years. This pattern makes sense, because there should 
not be positive correlation between economic growth and the rate at which typical start-ups 
are formed over the long term (Shane, 2009). 
 
A concern in recent studies regarding applying the cohort approach is the presence of a 
tendency toward micro-aggregation (an analysis where individual firms are not followed, but 
they are classified by certain criteria). Criscuolo et al (2014) used micro-aggregated data in 
their analysis of employment growth in 18 countries for the sake of harmonization. Anyadike 
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et al. (2015) studied the 1998 cohort in several countries by measuring firms’ development at 
their establishment and ten years later, using micro-aggregated data, to create a convenient 
data set. While these studies provide valuable information about the post-entry performance 
of new firms, we intend to address the gap caused by micro-aggregation, conducting a 
detailed firm-level empirical analysis. Based on previous research showing that technology 
may increase survival chances (Giovannetti et al., 2011), we would expect significant 
differences in the net contribution of a cohort of technology-based new firms. To explore this 
issue among NTBFs, we introduce the following research question:  
 
RQ3: Do NTBFs make a positive or negative contribution to job creation after their 
establishment year?  
  
 
3.  Methodology 
 
3.1  Data 
Our empirical setting is the Swedish population of NTBFs founded in 2006. The year 2006 is 
chosen because it provides (by 2014) eight years of historical records. Furthermore, this 
cohort has faced both an economic upswing and a severe downturn that started in 2008, thus 
providing significant variation regarding contextual factors. Sweden is known for its 
advanced firm registration system, making it a perfect context to carry out a cohort study. We 
identified the companies using Retriever Business, a database of financial and legal 
information on all businesses in Sweden. Retriever Business contains information, such as the 
organization number, number of employees, branches, information regarding boards, and 
annual reports, dating from 2000/2001 on all types of firms in Sweden, including sole 
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proprietorships. Many universities in Sweden have access to this database. Faculty, 
researchers, and students at the universities can use their university card or library card to 
virtually access most of the university library e-resources. We only considered firms 
organized as limited companies, excluding sole proprietorships and other legal forms. One 
reason for this limitation is that we want to avoid a sample with too many hobbies and 
lifestyle firms, which, in many ways, are different from limited companies.1  
 
Studies of the new technology-based industry have sought to define “high technology” 
(Markusen et al., 1986), and there are mainly two groups of indicators (Monck et al., 1988): 
measures of resource inputs to high-technology activities, such as R&D effort and R&D 
expenditure; and the employment of qualified personnel and measures of output or 
performance, such as growth, patent records, copyrights and licenses, and technological 
innovations. Patents are often used as an indicator of technological development, although the 
propensity to patent varies among sectors, firms, and countries (Taylor and Silberston, 1973). 
Storey and Tether (1998) provide an overview of new technology-based firms in Europe, and 
the article mainly discusses the characteristics of NTBFs and their founders. In our study, we 
used the Eurostat categorization of manufacturing and services industries according to 
technological intensity.2 Butchart (1987) pioneered the industry approach in the UK, which 
was widely applied after that (e.g., Brown et al., 2014). Based on the nomenclature of 
economic activities, NACE revision 2 codes (NACE is derived from the 
French Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans 
la Communauté européenne), we concentrate on firms in high-technology, medium-high-
technology, and knowledge-intensive high-technology services. We aggregated the firms at 
                                               
1 Another practical reason is that detailed annual report data is only available for businesses organized 
as limited companies. 
2 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/High-tech_statistics. 
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the two-digit level to minimize the chance that individual companies could be identified in the 
reported data. Table A in the Appendix summarizes the sector classification.  
 
--INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
 
We identify 1,143 NTBFs (limited liability companies) founded in Sweden in these sectors in 
2006. From this group of firms, 85% belong to knowledge intensive high-technology services, 
12% to medium-high-technology manufacturing, and 3% to high-technology manufacturing. 
We define companies started in 2006 as firms registered at the Swedish Companies 
Registration office in 2016 that were also registered for value added tax and tax prepayment 
(corporate tax, F-skatt) that year. This procedure helps us confirm that the company started 
operations that year (only firms that are active can be liable for VAT and corporate tax), and 
filter out dormant companies, shelf companies, and other entities that are not active. We also 
avoid uncertainties about what year they started by using a more precise definition of start 
year by excluding firms where registration year and VAT/F-tax year did not match. 
 
Furthermore, to control for the heterogeneity among new firms (Wennberg, 2005; Davidsson, 
2007), we restricted our analysis to companies that began operations as independent firms 
(not belonging to a business group). We thus avoid including spin-offs from existing 
businesses and other start-ups that are not “true” de novo firms. Hence, in the Retriever 
Database, we excluded all companies with consolidated (group) financial statement items. 
Formally, a firm must be included in consolidated financial statements when ownership of a 
firm is over 50%. Moreover, when ownership is between 20% and 50%, it is normally 
suggested that an associate company’s financial statements be included in the group financial 
statements. However, procedures may vary, and we cannot be entirely sure that all firms in 
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which another company’s ownership ranges between 0% and 50% are excluded from our 
dataset. We believe, however, that the firms in our sample are reasonably independent and 
that our definition of independence is aligned with prior research: all firms are less than 25 
years old and are established by a group of individuals rather than as a subsidiary of an 
already established firm (Little, 1979).  
 
As a result, we were left with 976 firms founded in 2006. We limit our research to the period 
between 2007 and 2014. To investigate survival and exit patterns among the NTBFs (RQ1), 
we conduct an in-depth analysis of the firm registry. With regards to the growth patterns of 
NTBFs (RQ2), we perform a growth analysis using various growth measures only for those 
NTBFs for which a full-time series of employment or sales is available. This is because we 
must be able to compare each firm’s development year by year. Including firms with, for 
example, only two years’ information would bias our analysis of temporal development. In 
one period we would have oranges, and in the other period, apples. By restricting analysis to 
firms with a full time series, we are sure to compare oranges to oranges each year. This 
restriction causes an additional bias. Firms with trouble generating sales are more likely not to 
report their sales. Thus, if these firms were included in the analysis, the inclusion would push 
down both median and mean values of sales each year. Therefore, our reported figures are 
slightly positive compared to figures of a complete cohort. Finally, with regard to whether a 
cohort of new firms destroys or continues creating new jobs after the establishment year 
(RQ3), we calculate the net impact of the cohort firms on job creation. 
 
3.2  Survival and growth measures 
3.2.1 Survival 
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To measure survival, we utilized firm registry information. According to Swedish legislation, 
there are informal and formal indicators for analyzing whether business operations are being 
initiated. From these, we concentrate on formal indicators, which include formal registration 
of a company and its name, and records of the tax prepayment and value added tax registries. 
These notably report that a company has been founded and that it proceeds to billing 
customers. We see a firm surviving as long as it is tied to administrative systems through its 
membership in different registries.  
 
3.2.2 Exit  
We considered a firm to have exited the population if any of the following conditions were 
met: (i) the firm does not show a positive status in the company status field (“Bolagets 
status”) of the firm registry; (ii) there is a note (“Anmärkning”) that the company has been 
liquidated or is in process of liquidation; (iii) the firm is de-registered for F-tax (tax 
prepayment registry); (iv) the firm is de-registered for value added tax; or (v) there is a de-
registration date in the company registry (“Avreg. datum”). We consider a merger with 
another firm or deregistration from the VAT registry and/or tax prepayment registry as a 
voluntary exit. We count companies dealing with bankruptcy or liquidation as forced exits. 
Hence, our measure of exit is a proxy for an organizational exit, and not an entrepreneurial 
exit (Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014) or business death, as Coad (2013) would phrase it. 
 
3.2.3 High growth  
Some scholars suggest using several measures rather than a single measure to allow easier 
comparisons across studies, more substantial robustness checks, and qualitative investigations 
of the differences between different quantitative indicators (Shepherd and Wiklund, 2009). 
Thus, to account for the effects of new and small firms’ growth and to increase our study’s 
18 
 
reliability, we apply three different approaches to studying high growth in NTBFs. The first 
method is the 50% annual sales growth threshold (Autio et al., 2000; Halabisky et al., 2006), 
which we call the “Autio approach.” The second approach is the OECD definition, according 
to which the measurement period begins when the firm has at least 10 employees and shows 
an average of 20% annual employee growth in a three-year period. Since 2007 is the first year 
of analysis, and 2014 the last year of study, we have five four-year periods during which a 
firm may qualify as a high-growth firm (2007-2010, 2008-2011, 2009-2012, 2010-2013, and 
2011-2014).  
 
To detect high-growth firms according to the OECD definition, we first calculated the annual 
growth rates, and then estimated the three-year averages. If the average was greater than 20%, 
the firm was defined as a high-growth company. Third, in addition to the OECD indicator, we 
apply the “Kink point” approach (Clayton et al., 2013), according to which small firms with 
less than 10 employees are included in the group of high-growth companies according to 
growth at the 10-employee threshold. Thus, for a firm with 10 employees, high growth would 
mean 7.28 additional employees over a three-year period. This is equivalent to average 
annualized growth of greater than 20 per­cent per year over a 3-year period (which equals the 
OECD rule). Consequently, for companies with less than 10 employees, a growth of eight 
employees or more is considered high-growth. By considering OECD and Kink point 
approaches together, we can include all NTBFs from the cohort in the analysis, independent 
of their initial size. Since we are interested in new firm growth, this seems a valuable 
addition. 
 
Moreover, when analyzing high-growth companies, we observed those firms that survived 
until the end of 2014, and that show positive sales or employment data from 2007 to 2014. 
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We separately analyzed firms that become group companies and those that remained 
independent during the observation period. For the 512 independent companies, we found 
complete employment time series for 293 firms, and complete sales time series for 390 firms. 
Similarly, for the 192 group firms, we found complete employment time series for 121 
companies, and complete sales time series for 151 firms. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results  
 
4.1  Survival and exit patterns among NTBFs 
From the 976 independent limited liability companies founded in 2006, by the end of 2014 
(eight years after the founding year), 704 companies were still operating, which corresponds 
to a survival rate of 72%. Among these, 512 remained independent, and 192 companies 
became part of a business group during the observation period. A surprisingly high number of 
firms from the 2006 cohort were still operational at the end of 2014.  
 
Figure 1 displays the temporal distribution of exits from the cohort between 2006 and 2014. 
The main observation from the statistics is that, after 2007, the annual number of exits rose to 
an average of 32 exits per year. This increase coincides with the financial crisis that began in 
2008. There also seems to be a slight upwards trend in the number of exits, with a peak in 
2015. Most firms that exited the population were independent (255 companies), and only a 
few firms were part of a business group at the time of exit (17 firms). 
 
--INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
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Moreover, as Table A in the Appendix shows, there seems to be some variance in 
exit/survival rates by industry. However, if we focus on sectors (two-digit NACE code level) 
with more than 20 startups in 2006, the survival rate ranges from 64% to 74%, with an 
average of 69%. Thus, looking at NTBF survival in the industries with the highest levels of 
firm concentration, survival rates are surprisingly evenly distributed. 
 
Regarding exit causes, it seems that an involuntary exit is more probable than a voluntary exit 
(Figure 1). From 2006 to 2014, around 57% (156) of the exits were forced, and 43% (116) 
exits were voluntary. On average, there were 12 voluntary exits and 16 forced exits per year. 
Looking at the firms that remained independent during the analysis period, we notice that 
40% of such companies experienced a voluntary exit, whereas 60% experienced a forced exit. 
With regard to firms that became part of a business group, 88% experienced a voluntary exit 
and 12% experienced a forced exit. Therefore, with respect to RQ1, among Swedish NTBFs 
during 2006-2014 we observed: (i) a survival rate of 72%; (ii) very little variance in survival 
rates across high-technology sectors; and (iii) around 57% of the exits were forced exits.  
 
4.2.   Empirical growth patterns among NTBFs 
4.2.1  Growth in general 
The analysis of our empirical data indicates that NTBFs have grown substantially. Whereas 
the mean sales level of 541 firms was 8,545 TKR in 2007, it had increased to 27,514 TKR by 
2014, showing an almost 222% increase. During the same period, the mean level of 
employees of 414 firms (for which we could find full time series of employment information) 
grew by 80%, from 5 to 9 employees. However, there were significant differences between 
companies that stayed independent during the observation period compared to firms that 
became part of a group. Independent firms remained small during the observation period, 
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while group firms grew much more. For the 390 independent companies for which we had 
complete sales time series, the sales (mean) indicator increased around 60% between 2007 
and 2014 (from 2,396 TKR to 3,847 TKR). Simultaneously, the sales (median) indicator 
decreased around 6% (from 1,399 TLR to 1,317 TKR). Among the firms that became part of 
a group, the sales (mean) indicator grew around 263% (from 24,425 TKR to 88,641 TKR), 
while the sales (median) indicator grew around 143% (from 2,887 TKR to 7,017 TKR). The 
increasing spread between the mean and median value of sales indicates the presence of a 
small group of firms that managed to grow quickly and is responsible for the overall positive 
development of group firms.  
 
The employment statistics show development patterns, similar to the sales statistics. The 
development of the 293 independent firms for which we had complete employee time series is 
rather modest in terms of employment growth during the period of analysis. The average 
independent firm, according to its median indicator, remained a two-employee organization 
during the entire period, though the mean indicator increased from 2 to 3 employees. This 
result is in contrast with the average group firm, for which the employee (mean) indicator 
increased 100% (from 12 to 24 employees), and the employee (median) indicator increased 
133% (from 3 to 7 employees).  
 
4.2.2  High growth 
The analysis of the empirical data indicates that, regardless of the growth measure used, only 
a small minority of companies qualified as high-growth firms. Table 2 reports the number of 
high-growth firms according to two different measurement approaches in each three-year 
period starting from 2007-2010 and ending in 2011-2014. We report high growth rates first 
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based on the OECD definition, and then using the Kink point approach. The third approach is 
the Autio approach (as outlined in Section 3.2). 
 
--INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE— 
 
As the data in Table 2 demonstrates, the number of high-growth NTBFs varies considerably 
across periods. According to the OECD definition, we can identify between 7 and 12 high-
growth NTBFs. When we combine the OECD approach with the Kink-point method, we 
identify between 21 and 26 high-growth NTBFs in our sample, while the number of high-
growth NTBFs varies between 2 to 13 using the Autio approach. Combining all three 
methods, the share of high-growth NTBFs in the 2006 cohort startups ranges from 0.2% 
(high-growth firms according to Autio definition from 2011 to 2014) to 2% (high-growth 
companies according to combined OECD – Kink-point approach from 2007 to 2010).  
 
4.2.3  Growth persistence 
The analysis of our empirical data indicates that high employment growth seems to persist, 
while strong sales growth does not. Between 54 % and 77% of NTBFs classified as high-
growth according to the joint OECD–Kink-point approach in one period are also classified as 
high-growth in the next period. However, this percentage falls in subsequent periods. For 
example, only 35% of high-growth NTBFs in the 2007-2010 period presented the same 
growth path in the 2011-2014 period. Furthermore, the results are considerably different when 
we use the Autio definition. Table 3 sheds light on the persistence of high growth, showing 
that most firms experienced only one growth phase during the observation period. This is 
especially true according to the Autio definition, as the number of companies that experienced 
more than one high-growth period differs significantly: 16 firms experienced one growth 
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period, 3 firms experienced two growth periods, and 4 companies experienced three growth 
periods. 
 
--INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE-- 
 
4.2.4  The coexistence of sales and employee growth  
The analysis of our empirical data indicates that the relationship between sales and 
employment growth is surprisingly stable for high-growth NTBFs, especially when high-
growth is measured using the combined OECD-Kink point approach. We observed a positive 
and stable correlation between the sales (median) and employment (median) indicators. Based 
on our observation, sales and employment seem to develop at almost the same rate. The cross-
correlations for both pairs of time series is 0.99. When using the Autio approach, the 
relationships become less smooth. Especially in terms of median development, employment 
changes seem to drive changes in sales. This is also apparent from the cross-correlations, 
which are 0.98 for the relationship between the means, and 0.79 for the relationship between 
the medians. 
 
Finally, we looked at the mean and median developments of sales and employment among 
NTBFs that do not classify as high-growth by any definition used here. For this group, the 
observed relationships are not nearly as consistent as for the high-growth NTBFs. Especially 
in terms of median development, employment changes seem to have no association with sales 
changes. This also appears in the cross-correlation, which is 0.70 for the relationship between 
the means, while no correlation exists for the relationship between the medians. 
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To answer RQ2, among Swedish NTBFs during 2006-2014, we observed: (i) independent 
new firms stayed small, while those that became part of groups grew much more; (ii) around 
0.2%–2% of the NTBFs qualified as high-growth firms, depending on the definition of high 
growth; (iii) while two-thirds of the NTBFs achieved high growth in two subsequent periods, 
less than one third were able to sustain high growth over three periods; (iv) sales and 
employment growth seem to move together in high-growth NTBFs, while this relationship is 
less clear among non-high-growth NTBFs.  
 
4.3  Empirical job creation patterns 
The analysis of our empirical data indicates that the 2006 cohort had a positive impact on 
employment from 2007 to 2014. Table 4 reports the statistics for 976 NTBFs that were 
independent at the time of establishment according to Eurostat industry classifications. Table 
4 shows the annual increase in employment of the cohort compared to the previous year, as 
well as annual employment destroyed by exiting firms. The NTBFs founded in 2006 had a 
total of 2,451 employees in 2007 (one year after establishment). After the founding year, the 
net job creation ranged between 64 and 323 employees. As an answer to RQ3, the cohort of 
Swedish NTBFs considered in the study made a positive contribution to job creation after 
their establishment year. The surviving NTBFs had a positive and significant impact on job 
creation even when we consider the jobs destroyed by exiting NTBFs. 
 
--INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE-- 
 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusions 
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Our empirical exploration of survival and growth patterns among a cohort of Swedish NTBFs 
between 2007-2014 provides several interesting insights. First, survival rates were unusually 
high among the sampled NTBFs. Second, a very small number of NTBFs achieved high 
growth, and the number of high-growth NTBFs varied substantially, depending on the 
definition of high growth. Third, NTBFs seemed to be net job creators after their 
establishment year.  
 
5.1  Survival and exit patterns among NTBFs 
We found that a surprisingly high number of firms from the 2006 cohort were still operational 
at the end of 2014 (72%). As pointed out in our literature review, we expected the survival 
rates to range between 30% and 55%. Why do our observations of Swedish NTBFs indicate a 
much higher survival rate? Is it because we investigate survival rates in Sweden, or because 
we focused on NTBFs? Was our study period particularly safe for firms? One explanation for 
our higher survival rate (compared to other studies) might be that we filtered out firms that 
never actually started any operations, and thus were also more likely to exit (e.g., due to the 
financial and administrative costs of maintaining a non-active firm). This also highlights the 
need for future studies to elaborate more on the issue of how a firm’s entry is measured. We 
encourage future research to focus on other contexts to establish whether the survival and exit 
patterns we observed are usual or unusual. According to Ejemo and Xiao (2014), NTBFs 
generally experience a lower hazard rate compared to other entrepreneurial firms, which is 
interpreted as a sign of their high “quality.” Ejemo and Xiao report a significantly negative 
coefficient at the 1% level, which means that NTBFs have a lower logit hazard than other 
entrepreneurial firms. This also implies a lower hazard rate for NTBFs than for other 
entrepreneurial firms.  
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Furthermore, we observed that the high survival rates are similar across different technology 
sectors, and are nearly in line with some earlier studies. In comparison, Coleman et al. (2013) 
found that, after five years of operation, the survival rate for the weighted sample was 56.0 
percent, and their findings also revealed industry differences in terms of exit. Löfsten (2016) 
observed the survival rate among NTBFs, which was 55% (between 2005-2014). Macdonald 
(2012) found surprisingly little variation across industries when investigating survival rates 
among Canadian firms founded in 2002. Also, our observation reveals rather constant exit 
rates among NTBFs, in contrast with the notion of liability-of-newness. We do not find 
NTBFs to have higher casualty rates in the first years after the founding. Instead, it seems that 
the mortality rate is equally distributed during the first seven years. These observations could 
indicate that NTBFs are less impacted by liability-of-newness, which is a conclusion that 
scholars could integrate into theoretical models in future studies.  
 
Finally, we observed that, among the studied NTBFs, there were slightly more involuntary 
exits (57%) than voluntary exits (43%). Intuitively, we think about exits as involuntary acts. 
We consider a merger with another company or deregistration from the VAT registry and/or 
tax prepayment registry as voluntary exits, and we count firms dealing with bankruptcy or 
liquidation as forced exits. In studying a sample of Swedish firms founded in 1995, Wennberg 
et al. (2010) found that 66% had experienced an exit by 2002, for the following reasons: 
harvest liquidation (26%), distress liquidation (25%), harvest sale (8%), and distress sale 
(6%). If we consider harvest liquidation and harvest sale as voluntary exits, and distress 
liquidation and distress sale as an involuntary exist, we identify 51% voluntary exits and 49% 
involuntary exits. However, as our definitions are not compatible with those employed by 
Wennberg et al., this should be considered with caution. 
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5.2  Growth patterns among NTBFs 
We observed that, regardless of the growth measure used, only a small minority of firms 
qualified as high-growth companies. This observation echoes earlier findings in the literature, 
as not all firms attempt to grow or can grow; in fact, few start-ups wish to grow (Storey, 
1994). Previous findings indicate that company growth rates follow a Laplace distribution 
with its characteristic “tent-shape” (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006), meaning that most firms are 
not growing at all and only a few companies experience high growth. In the 2006 cohort of 
Swedish NTBFs, we found that between 0.2% and 2% of firms are classified as high-growth 
companies. In comparison, the OECD reports that, in Sweden, the rate of high-growth 
enterprises varied between 4% and 6% (OECD, 2015). However, the OECD’s rate of high-
growth firms estimates the number of high-growth companies as a percentage of the 
population of companies with 10 or more employees. In this study, we estimated the share of 
all high-growth firms in a cohort.   
 
We further observed that sales growth and employment growth among high-growth firms 
seem to be correlated, especially when using the employment-based growth measure. This 
observation is in contrast with some previous findings. For example, Shepherd and Wiklund’s 
(2009) study on correlations between different growth measures showed that employment and 
sales growth were only modestly correlated.  
 
5.3  Job creation and destruction patterns among NTBFs 
We found that the 2006 cohort had a positive impact on employment from 2007 to 2014. This 
observation also contradicts some earlier findings. For example, Shane (2009) claims that 
cohort studies on new companies show that new firms provoke net job destruction after the 
year of their establishment. That is, the jobs created by surviving and growing new firms do 
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not exceed the number of jobs lost by new companies exiting the market. There are two 
assumptions in our analysis. First, new firms do not displace (or generate) jobs in other 
existing companies. Second, all growth is internal (no acquisitions). It is very hard to measure 
the extent to which these two phenomena affect the actual job creation of NTBFs. In the 2006 
cohort of Swedish NTBFs, job creation exceeds job destruction in each year of the 
observation period, and ranges between 64 and 323 employees. This finding, in addition to 
the high survival rates, indicates the importance of NTBFs for the Swedish economy, in 
contrast with Brown et al.’s (2014) conclusion on the NTBF sector in Scotland, where “the 
economic significance of TBFs is arguably not so great as commonly assumed.”  
 
Our findings might be partly explained by our more precise measures of start year and exit. 
While most previous studies based on firm register data use the company’s registration date as 
the start date, we use the tax registration (VAT) date. Since only firms that are active can be 
liable for VAT and corporate tax (F-tax), dormant companies, shelf companies, and other 
entities that are not active are excluded from our dataset. Therefore, we believe that our 
dataset is free of statistical noise. In addition, our measure of exit is based on a proxy for 
organizational exit, where the company ceases to exist. This should not be confused with 
other forms of exits that are considered in the literature, such as entrepreneurial or individual 
exit (Wennberg and DeTienne, 2014), since there might be an entrepreneurial exit without an 
organizational exit. As in all research, the design of this study has several limitations, which 
also offer promising avenues for future research. Our data were based on only one cohort and 
we therefore encourage future studies to replicate and extend our study by investigating 
several cohorts at the same time. In addition, we encourage future scholarly work to 
investigate the potential benefits, and drawbacks, of NTBFs on our societies in a more general 
sense. For example, while NTBFs seem to create net jobs in our study, what happens at the 
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side of existing firms in the industry: do they destroy jobs because of new entrants?   
 
5.4  Conclusions 
Our study contributes to the current understanding of new technology-based firm growth in 
several ways. First, we find a surprisingly high survival rate (72%) for the 2006 cohort of 
NTBFs as of the end of 2014. This rate is higher than those reported in previous studies. In 
addition, we find that very few firms experience high-growth during their first seven years 
(0.2% -2% for the cohort), and that, among the high-growth firms, employment growth and 
sales growth are highly correlated. We also find that, in the 2006 cohort of Swedish NTBFs, 
job generation exceeds job destruction for each year observed. Our empirical results seem to 
suggest that new firms operating in high-technology sectors rarely achieve high growth, but 
they seem to have much higher survival rates compared to the traditional belief of high 
mortality rates among new companies.    
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Appendix   
 
 
  
Table A. Survival rates in different NACE two-digit categories.  
  
Nace 2 digit Founded in 2006 Exit by year 2016 Sum 
Survival 
Percentage 
  No group Group   
20 10 4 0 4 60 % 
21 6 0 0 0 100 % 
25 1 0 0 0 100 % 
26 25 9 0 9 64 % 
27 19 5 1 6 68 % 
28 42 15 0 15 64 % 
29 21 7 0 7 67 % 
30 4 0 0 0 100 % 
32 16 5 0 5 69 % 
59 144 36 0 36 75 % 
60 1 1 0 1 0 % 
61 14 6 1 7 50 % 
62 533 130 10 140 74 % 
63 59 17 2 19 68 % 
72 81 20 3 23 72 % 
 976 255 17 272  
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Table 1.  High-technology sectors NACE Revision 2 codes. 
 
Technology Sector NACE Revision 2 codes  
 
High-technology 
manufacturing 
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations 
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical products 
Medium high-technology 
manufacturing 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
 
27 to 30 Manufacture of electrical equipment; Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.; Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
Knowledge-intensive 
high-technology services  
59 to 63 Motion picture, video, and television program production, sound 
recording and music publishing activities; Programming and broadcasting 
activities; Telecommunications. 
Computer programming, consultancy, and related activities; Information 
service activities 
 
72 Scientific research and development 
  
 
 
 
Table 2. Number of high-growth firms among the 2006 cohort of Swedish NTBFs  
 according to different measures.  
 
 Number of HGFs 
OECD approach Group Independent Sum 
High growth firm according OECD definition 2007-2010 7 0 7 
High growth firm according OECD definition 2008-2011 7 1 8 
High growth firm according OECD definition 2009-2012 7 0 7 
High growth firm according OECD definition 2010-2013 10 2 12 
High growth firm according OECD definition 2011-2014 9 2 11 
 Number of HGFs 
KINK point approach Group Independent Sum 
High growth firm according KINK point definition 2007-2010 15 4 19 
High growth firm according KINK point definition 2008-2011 10 6 16 
High growth firm according KINK point definition 2009-2012 10 5 15 
High growth firm according KINK point definition 2010-2013 9 3 12 
High growth firm according KINK point definition 2011-2014 8 2 10 
 Number of HGFs 
 Group Independent Sum 
High growth firm according Autio definition 2007-2010 7 6 13 
High growth firm according Autio definition 2008-2011 
6 4 10 
High growth firm according Autio definition 2009-2012 
3 5 8 
High growth firm according Autio definition 2010-2013 
4 2 6 
High growth firm according Autio definition 2011-2014 1 1 2 
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Table 3. Number of high growth periods among the 2006 cohort  
 of Swedish NTBFs according to different measures.  
 
Number of 
HG periods 
N of Firms 
according 
OECD 
approach 
N of 
Firms 
according 
to Kink 
point 
approach 
N of 
Firms 
according 
to Autio 
approach 
1 11 16 16 
2 5 13 3 
3 5 7 4 
4 1 1 0 
5 1 0 1 
Sum 23 37 24 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Employment creation by the 2006 cohort of Swedish NTBFs.  
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Employees in surviving firms 2459 2714 2894 3000 3206 3476 3824 4135 
Employment created in  
comparison to previous year 2459 255 180 106 206 270 348 311 
Number of firms 703 702 704 704 704 704 702 703 
Employment destroyed  
(compared to previous year) -8 -60 -24 -42 -91 -130 -25 -26 
Number of exiting firms -8 -32 -21 -23 -23 -39 -33 -24 
Annual surplus to employment 2451 195 156 64 115 140 323 285 
 
 
Figure 1 Number of exits per year (voluntary and forced, separated).   
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